





# Benefit corporations: are they really sustainable?

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### In general

What is a company for?

Profit...

• ...or more?

In this area we have to consider sustainability – hard to define!

- But this does not necessarily involve more costs for the company







### We can distinguish...

- Between
  - Usual companies
    - Mainly usually just profit

and

- "good" companies
  - Not just profit but some social benefit
    - Who decides when a benefit is a benefit?
    - And how much?







### Usual companies

- Some benefits for the community...
- ...but most commonly as a marketing perspective
  - Medium to long-term advantage for the company (reputation)
- Stronger commitment might be possible, but rather rare







#### Whose commitment?

- 2 levels:
  - Fundamental basis: members/shareholders
  - Management basis: directors
- Theoretically, the directors could never go against shareholders
  - Practically, well, they have their own interests...







### But there is a huge "if"

- What is a normal company for?
- Just profit?
- Profit, and...?
- Not the same everywhere: more or less shades, but there is a grand classic: profit maximisation (mainly in the US)
  - Social norm, not legal norm
  - Easier life for directors; easier to have them liable







#### Who maximises and for whom?

- The directors, theoretically in the interest of the shareholders
  - But not necessarily
- What can shareholders do to impose decision to the directors?
  - Depending on the national company law
  - Anyway, in general dismissal
  - But again in general, the directors hold the management power
- These decisions might be dealing with social benefits:
  - This is the starting point of benefit companies







### Benefit companies, where do they come from?

- Private labels for a private certification Certified B-Corp
- US company B-Lab
- The underlying idea: in the US profit maximisation is the strongest – if I want to be different, I need to signal my enterprise
  - Only where (State-based company law) I am allowed to
  - Also but not only marketing purpose







### No problem, so far...

- ... the problem is when the label passes from private to public...
- ... and the how this is carried out!

- By the way: not all of them are even named as "benefit"
  - E.g. in France, société à mission







### B-Lab as a private lawmaker... or lobby

- From a private certification B-Lab develops a Model Benefit Company Legislation...
- ...and submits it to local lawmakers, to overcome the necessary profit maximisation paradigm by creating a new model of enterprise)
  - In the US: Maryland (2010), + 36!
  - The assumption is debatable in its fallout...
- But also where there is not a strict logic of profit maximisation!
  - EU: Italy, France, Spain...
  - And other: BC, Columbia, Ecuador, Peru, Puerto Rico







### What do they do?

- Profit is pursued along with a public benefit
  - General benefit
    - Positive material impact or reduction of negative material impact on the community and the environment generally considered
  - And/or special benefit
    - Identification of a series of categories and people in the articles of incorporation
      - People, communities, territories, environment, cultural and social activities, , workers, customers, suppliers...







### General vs. special benefit

- General: model act -> general commitment
- Special: Delaware, Italy -> specific identification of beneficiaries

- Risk: even if special, too generic
  - If it is so, what's the directors' actual duty?







### But the point is that...

- If there is a specific benefit purpose in the articles, the directors *must* pursue it
  - If there is a general benefit, not necessarily, at least in the States
- Discretionarily on the how, but not on the if
  - As it is in usual companies
  - Duty to balance between the profit and the benefit
    - Even if this is not necessarily true...
    - Cases where the company increases its profits via benefit activities







#### How to do that?

Duty of care: the company must be managed in a...

- ...Transparent,...
- ...Responsible, and...
- ...Sustainable -> meaning? Perhaps not damaging one stakeholder while benefitting another (principle ex Taxonomy regulation)

Way

E.g.: Delaware and Italy

But: what about the "normal" companies' duty of care?







### Benefit impact ad its measurement

- Standards...
- Generally elaborated by B-Lab
- Fine, if it is just a private label...
- ...but if it is a public model...
  - Huge risk of conflict of interest
  - And very arbitrary threshold settings
    - There is for the private label (very low: 80/200)...
    - ...but for the public one, apart from France...







### **But in any case....**

- This does not deal with the company's qualification!
- In most cases, it is a self assessment, and box-ticking
- Only in France there is a much more effective system of external assessment
  - Perhaps even too demanding! Very few sociétés à mission







# Where does the information go?

- Benefit report:
  - What you've done in general
  - In specific common benefit
  - Obstacles
  - Justify the chosen standard
- Yearly issued (every second year, Delaware)
- Duty of the directors







### Who's in charge?

- The benefit officer (Model legislation and Italy; or the comité de mission in France)
  - Specific obligations regarding the pursuit of the benefit purpose
  - Specific obligations regarding the drafting of the report
  - In charge for enacting?
    - Depends if director (in Italy not necessarily; in France neither, and with the participation of an employee) – and the role
    - For sure duty to give advice to the directors on the topic







### The directors (or officers)

- Duty to balance profit and benefit purpose...
- ...but how doing that is left to them
- Clearer obligations if specific (very specific) common benefit
- Blurred obligations if general benefit







# What if... they do not comply?

- This is the major of the flaws
- The directors are liable, everywhere, but towards the company and the shareholders...
- "never towards external constituencies/stakeholders
- The point is private or public (somehow France) enforcement
  - In Italy (but in general in the EU): unfair competition (customers and competitors entitled)







#### And also...

- ... in many jurisdictions, the shareholders need to point out a damage for the company to sue the directors...
- ...what if no damage occurs as a consequence of noncompliance? Or even more profit was produced?







#### Some other flows

- The spirit
  - Do we really need specific company forms to have "good" companies?
    - France shows that very well with a three-step system coming with the Loi Pacte:
      - Directors' duties towards constituencies other than shareholders (enlightened shareholders' value – Section 172 CA UK 2006) – directors' possibility
      - company's purpose
      - sociétés à mission directors' duty
- The wording in some States
  - Italy, for instance: de facto no pursuit for common benefit purpose (not singular one-off activities) by normal companies







#### Some other flows

- What if the main purpose is reputation? Is there a minimum benefit threshold required?
- Public/private non-competition with B-Lab: conflict of interests
- Public assessment (apart from France)
- But, in general: is it up to the State supplying labels?







### What about sustainability

- Considered in the duty of care
- Possible (but needed?) in the activity
  - Sure that every kind of common benefit falls within sustainability?
  - Sure that companies with very impacting activities are forbidden from getting the qualification?
    - Questioning the general holistic idea of sustainability
- In the multi-stakeholder perspective, is there a balance between the benefit activities?
- Pay attention to unintended consequences: to have a more sustainable specific company form, there's the risk that the others will go more towards a profit-only approach
  - Would this be good, for the system as a whole?